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Fiscal Rules and Composition Bias 





Using a sample of OECD countries, this paper finds that while fiscal rules succeeded in 
reducing total government expenditures and budget deficits in the medium term, they 
significantly affected the composition of government expenditure: the ratio of social transfers 
to government consumption declined. In contrast, we do not find a stable effect of fiscal rules 
on public investment. It is shown that the compositional shift against social transfers is 
beyond “from welfare to work” policies, which have been adopted by many OECD countries 
during the nineties. Our empirical examination reveals that the reduction of social transfers 
relative to government consumption did not occur in countries with strong legal protection to 
social rights. 
JEL-Code: H00, H30, E62. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last decade a wide range of OECD countries adopted budget and expenditure 
rules. The increase from less than 5 countries in the seventies and eighties, to 30 
countries after the nineties (Calderon and Schmidt Hebbel, 2008) could be partially 
explained by the effectiveness of numerical fiscal rules in curtailing budget deficits in 
different parts of the world, and at different government levels [for the US see 
Poterba, 1994; Alt and Lowry, 1994; Alesina and Bayoumi, 1996; for Latin America 
see Alesina et al, 1999 and for Switzerland see Krogstrup and Walti, 2008].
2 
Krogstrup and Walti (2008), using a panel of Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions, show 
that fiscal rules have a significant effect on budget deficits even after controlling for 
voter preferences to exclude the possibility that this correlation is driven by an 
omitted variable (preferences). 
 
Both policy makers and researchers were aware of the possible costs of adopting 
fiscal rules along side the benefits of budgetary discipline.
3 The main concern was 
that balance budget rules are expected to deepen recessions according to the 
Keynesian view.
4 Nevertheless, Alesina and Bayoumi (1996) found, based on a 
sample of US states, that fiscal rules have not increased output volatility. More 
recently several papers detect no evidence that fiscal rules amplify economic 
fluctuations (See Gali and Perotti, 2003 for EMU countries, Fatas and Mihov, 2006 
for US states and Badinger, 2009 for OECD countries). 
 
                                                  
2 See also Guichard et al. (2007) who found that both expenditure and budget rules anchored successful 
fiscal consolidations. 
3 Kopits (2001) provides a list of arguments for and against budget rules.  
4 From a neo-classical point of view, balance budget rules may impose costs due to sub-optimal path of 
tax rates (Barro, 1979).   3
Fiscal rules may provoke costs also as consequence of an unintentional change in the 
composition of government expenditures. Fiscal consolidation as a result of budget 
rules could be in various forms: higher taxes, lower public consumption, lower public 
investment, lower transfer payments and a combination of all the above. Ideally, the 
particular form of fiscal restrain should be in accordance with cost-benefit 
considerations: the chosen tax rate should minimize the excess burden of taxation, and 
the cut in expenditure should be focused on the items with the lowest (marginal) 
social welfare. In practice, however, political economy considerations are likely to 
play an important role in determining the composition of government expenditures 
cut. 
 
Balanced budget rules such as Maastricht-related constraints do not specify what type 
of government expenditure should be cut to meet the specified budget targets and that 
leaves room for governments to execute various policy mixes.
5 Public consumption, 
and especially government wages, might be less prone to cuts because of the relative 
strength of lobbies (unions). That would be the case if the median voter is protected 
by unions,
6 or when wages is considered by governments as more "visible", and 
consequently are less exposed to cuts.
7 In contrast, due to the same political economy 
reasons, governments could choose sub-optimal level of public investment which may 
be harmful in terms of long-run economic growth. Transfer payments may be also 
subject to disproportional cut as a result of binding budget rules. Unbalanced cut in 
                                                  
5 Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004) have criticized SGP for not excluding public investment from the 
definition of the budget. Balassone and Franco (2000) discuss the application of a golden rule in the 
presence of a fiscal rule. 
6  A recent paper focusing on the median voter preferences is Creedy and Moslehi (2009), who follows 
the seminal contribution by Richard and Meltzer (1981). 
7 Sanz and Velazquez (2003) show that for political reasons governments may choose expenditure 
composition guided by an impulse of avoiding cuts in "visible expenses". Clearly, government wages 
are visible expenses, since unions are equipped with tools such as strikes that can easily make wage 
cuts more visible.   4
monetary aid to disadvantageous groups may drive inequality and poverty to a level 
that is inconsistent with social preferences. Scholz and Levine (2001) and Birsall 
(1998) have raised the fear that fiscal rules might undermine the commitment of the 
affluent countries to address income inequality.  
 
The empirical literature on the costs side of fiscal rules has almost overlooked the 
costs that may be associated with an unintended change in the composition of 
government expenditures.
8 A simple inspection of countries that implemented 
expenditure and balanced budget rules at the national level reveals a clear decline in 
the ratio of government transfers to public consumption after the implementation of 
the rules (Figures 1a and 1b), and in the ratio of government investment to 
government consumption in countries that adopted the Maastricht Treaty (Figure 1c).   
 
The goal of this paper is to fill this gap by exploring the effect of numerical fiscal 
rules on the composition of government expenditures in developed countries. We first 
start by examining the effectiveness of fiscal rules in reducing budget deficits and the 
size of government expenditures. Then, we examine whether the difference of rates of 
change between public investment and transfer payments relative to government 
consumption are significantly different before and after the introduction of fiscal 
rules, controlling for a standard list of explanatory variables including the level of 
these ratios. We shall clearly emphasize that our paper does not resolve the more 
difficult question of whether the composition of government expenditure is sub-
optimal after the introduction of fiscal rules. 
 
                                                  
8 Gali and Perotti (2003) is an exception with regard to public investment but they have not examined 
the effect on redistribution policy. In a sample that includes the nineties, they found no empirical 
support for the claim that fiscal rules reduce public investment.   5
The paper is organized as follows: the next section analyzes the effect of fiscal rules 
on fiscal consolidations. The main result of the paper is presented in Section 3. It is 
shown that fiscal rules reduced the growth rate of social transfers more than that of 
government consumption. In section 4 we discuss two policy issues: first, we test 
whether the effect of fiscal rules on the government transfers over government 
consumption ratio is beyond the general adoption of "from welfare to work" policies 
at OECD countries; second, we analyze whether countries with a strong social 
security legislation cope better with the expenditure composition effect of fiscal rules. 
Section 5 concludes, Appendix A explore the effects of fiscal rules using a definition 
of central government, which in some cases is the basic unit of fiscal rules, and 
Appendix B shows results after controlling also for political structure. 
 
2. Fiscal rules and fiscal performance 
2.1 The data   
We use a panel of 22 OECD countries
9 during the period 1960 to 2006 to test the 
effects of fiscal rules on actual budget deficits and general government expenditures, 
and its composition according to three items: government consumption, social 
transfers and government investment.
10 Since occasionally the rules are based on a 
central government definition, in appendix A we analyze the robustness of our results 
to this definition. The source of our data is the OECD.
11  Budget deficit is measured 
by the ratio of nominal government net balance to nominal GDP. The rates of change 
                                                  
9 This list includes all OECD countries except Luxembourg, Mexico, Turkey and the new members 
(Slovak Republic, Poland, Hungary, Korea, Czech Republic). Our choice of countries, which is shown 
in Table 1, is related to data availability. 
10 The following are the items according to the OECD database: for investment - gross capital 
formation; for transfers – subsidies + social benefits and social transfers in kind + other current 
transfers + capital transfers; and for consumption - final government consumption. 
11 We checked consistency of our historical data with the data used by Philip Lane (2003), to whom we 
are thankful.    6
of government expenditures and its items are computed as the logarithmic change of 
government expenditure, deflated by GDP prices. The choice of GDP prices as a 
deflator is in line with Lane (2003): by using GDP prices, we capture the rise in 
government wages over domestic prices. Since wages is potentially one of the main 
political economy forces driving the dynamics of expenditure, it is important to allow 
them to play a role. 
 
Fiscal rules are represented by dummy variables that take the value of 1 during the 
period that starts at the adoption date of the rule and lasts until the rule is abandoned 
(otherwise it continues until the end of the sample), and 0 otherwise. Table 1 shows 
the implementation years for the different rules and countries. This data for Table 1 is 
based on an extended version of Table 2 of Guichard et al. (2007), who consider 
budget and expenditure rules on a broad basis. Their original database reflects fiscal 
rules that were effective at the time that paper was written while the extended 
database includes also past fiscal rules that were abandoned.
12 
 
We consider four different definitions for fiscal rules: i) budget rules adopted at the 
national level (BTARGET); ii) expenditure rules adopted at the national level 
(ETARGET); iii) Participation at the Maastricht Treaty starting at the year in which 
the treaty was approved at a national referendum (MAAS).
13 The years in Table 1 are 
the years at which the referendum took place (and approved); iv) Participation in the 
                                                  
12 We deviate from that database with respect to expenditure rules in the US following Auerbach 
(2008) who stresses that the expenditure rule adopted in the US does not match our expenditure rule 
broad definition since the rule was applied for discretionary spending, excluding social insurance 
spending for health, social security (retirement and disability pensions), unemployment and other 
entitlement programs. 
13  Since there are national debates about participating at the super-national agreements, it is important 
to define since when the fiscal rule is binding. We assume that the result of a referendum is compelling 
from the point of view of policy makers.   7
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) combined with the adoption of the Euro, which 
represents a binding commitment.  
 
The choice of these four different definitions, allows for testing different degrees of 
rules effectiveness, depending on whether the rules are at the national level or at 
super-national level. Moreover, by using interaction variables, defined as the 
multiplication of the different dummy variables representing the rules, we can test the 
effectiveness of combined application of rules. Note, for example, that Germany 
implemented all types of rules, while Iceland did not adopt any rule and the US is the 
single country that abolished an existing budget rule without adopting another one 
until the end of the sample. While in our tables we report the results for the different 
fiscal rules, we also checked the interaction combinations of all types of rules.
14  
 
We perform GMM estimations using country fixed effects. The effects of national 
fiscal rules (BTARGET and ETARGET) are estimated with and without year fixed 
effects to account for the "competition" between year fixed effects and our central 
dummy variables for fiscal rules which are in fact period dummy variables. The 
inclusion of year fixed effects might underestimate the effect of fiscal rules depending 
on how many countries adopt the same fiscal rule at the same time. The adoption of 
the same fiscal rule at almost the same year by a large share of countries (Maastricht 
Treaty at the beginning of the nineties and of the Stability and Growth Pact in 1997) is 
the reason why year fixed effects are not included in the estimation when super-
national rules (MAAS and SGP) are employed. 
                                                  
14 Since in many cases national and super-national rules were implemented simultaneously, we include 
in the regressions one rule at a time. Combined application of rules is of course an important issue, 
which is tested through interaction terms. To avoid an excessively detailed presentation these 
regressions are not reported in the paper, but they are available from the authors.   8
To capture a medium term perspective, the dependent variable and all non-dummy 
independent variables are calculated using four years moving averages.
15 In all 
regressions we report robust standard deviations, using period panel corrected 
standard errors. 
 
Finally, in all the regressions we use a standard list of control variables measured in 
moving average over four-years: population growth (DlogPOP) to account for the 
need of increasing public services, GDP growth (DlogY) which represents the 
availability of resources, and the growth of population under 15 years old 
(DlogPOP15) which intensively demands public services such as education and child 
allowances. We also tried a dummy variable reflecting election years, and the increase 
in population over 65 years old (DlogPOP65) which represents the demand for old-
age transfers, but in most cases they were not significant. 
 
Note also that changes in the dependent variables may reflect a correction for their 
levels: for example, the reduction in transfer payments over consumption ratio may 
reflect a correction for its high level at the beginning of the nineties. Thus, it is crucial 
to control in all the regressions for the lagged level of the dependent variable, 
calculated as well as a four-years moving average. In the budget deficit regressions, 
we use a control variable a la Barro (1979), to capture high and transitory government 
expenditures. This variable is calculated using high deviations of expenditure (higher 
in absolute value than one standard deviation) from an hp filtered trend.
16 
 
                                                  
15 The vast majority of our results hold also with moving averages of three and five years. 
16 Employing an index of violent and non-violent conflicts (CONFLICT) based on the Heidelberg 
Institute of International Conflict Research turns out to be unproductive. Oddly, we found a negative 
and significant coefficient for CONFLICT in the regression of government consumption rate of 
change, which is the category that includes defense expenditure.   9
In sum, the estimated panel regression, for 22 countries, is: 
(1)    t , c t c t , c t , c t , c X FR Y ε + φ + δ + γ + β + α =  
Where the dependent variable, Yc,t, represents the rate of change for one of the several 
fiscal variables (e.g., the growth rate of government consumption) in country c in year 
t, FRc,t stands for fiscal rule dummy variable in country c in year t and Xc,t symbolizes 
a list of control variables including the level of the dependent variable. δc and φt are 
country and year fixed effects, respectively. We are mainly interested in the sign of  β 
and its size. 
 
Equation (1) is in fact a diff-in-diff regression which provides cleaner estimates for 
the effect of fiscal rules. The central dependent variables are measured as a difference 
between rates of change of two fiscal variables such as transfer payments and 
government consumption and the main explanatory variable also represents a 
difference - before and after the introduction of fiscal rules. 
 
Note, that we do not examine whether countries violate the fiscal targets that have 
been adopted (as in the case of Italy, Portugal and Greece) but rather whether these 
budgetary rules influence fiscal performance. In particular, the budget deficit or any 
other fiscal measure may be lower after the introduction of fiscal rules and at the same 
time may exceed the specified target. 
 
2.2 Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Consolidation 
Tables 2 and 3 present the estimation results of equation (1) for various fiscal rules, 
where the dependent variable in Table 2 is the first difference of general government   10




Table 2 shows that budget rules both at the national and super-national levels are 
significantly effective in reducing medium term budget deficits after taking into 
account a standard list of control variables, country and year fixed effects. The 
reduction of the deficit is relatively large, and it ranges between 0.28 to 0.63 
percentage points of GDP.
17 Note, that most of the control variables have the expected 
signs. An expenditure rule at the national level (ETARGET) has a negative effect on 
budget deficit (change) but it is significant only when year fixed effects are excluded.  
  
A similar picture emerges regarding the effectiveness of fiscal rules in reducing total 
government expenditures growth rate (Table 3). Fiscal rules have a consolidated 
effect on total expenditures as implied by their coefficients. The medium term 
reduction in the growth rates of total government expenditures is quantitatively large 
and it ranges between 0.5 and 3.1 percent. Note, however, that both the size and 
significance are sensitive to the inclusion of year fixed effects. 
 
3. Fiscal Rules and Government Expenditure composition 
Following the adoption of fiscal rules, a utilitarian policy maker should cut 
expenditures in the items with lowest social marginal utility. Examining whether 
fiscal rules induce suboptimal changes in the composition of government expenditures 
                                                  
17 In non-reported regressions we obtained that the combinations BTARGET*ETARGET and 
BTARGET*ETARGET*MAAS derived on higher (in absolute value) coefficients, significant at 1 
percent. The strong impact of combined rules is in the spirit of the result found by von-Hagen (2005), 
who showed that strong fiscal rules have been effective when combined with a design of the budget 
process enabling governments to commit to the rule.   11
would involve estimating the marginal utility of broad government items such as 
public consumption, investment and transfer payments for each country. We pursue 
here the more modest task of assessing empirically the impact of fiscal rules on 
government expenditures composition that are captured by two variables. The first 
variable is the difference between the rate of change of transfer payments and the rate 
of change of government consumption and the second one is the difference between 
the rate of change of public investment and the rate of change of government 
consumption. 
 
3.1 Transfer payments Vs. government consumption 
Table 4 documents the impact of fiscal rules on the first aspect of the composition of 
government expenditures: transfer payments relative to government consumption. 
Fiscal rules have a negative effect on transfer payments relative to government 
consumption (Table 4). The negative coefficient of fiscal rules dummy variable is 
significant for both the expenditure rule and for the Maastricht Treaty. The estimated 
impact of ETARGET is robust to the inclusion of year fixed effects. 
 
As would be expected, the coefficient of expenditure rule (ETARGET) is the highest 
as complying with such rule leaves less degrees of freedom than a budget rule, in 
which governments could in addition impose higher tax rates to meet the rule. Note 
also that the coefficient of transfer payments relative to public consumption level is 
negative and significant – meaning that countries tend to lower the rate of change of 
that difference when the previous level is high.  
   12
One possible explanation for the results on expenditure composition is that under 
sticky wages, complying with the rule implies a need for cuts other than public wage 
bill (other things being equal). In order to test this hypothesis we run the same 
regressions using real government wages instead of government consumption.  
 
As can be seen from Table 4 (columns 7 and 8), the difference between the change in 
log transfer payments and change in log public wage bill is negatively affected by the 
adoption of an expenditure rule and this result is not sensitive to the inclusion of year 
fixed effects. Interestingly, the coefficient of the expenditure rule in the social 
transfers is higher than that for government consumption. Thus, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the composition effect is partially related to the explanation used in 
the political economy literature. 
 
Two additional robustness checks are provided in appendixes A and B. The findings 
regarding the negative impact of fiscal rules on the growth rate of transfer payments 
(relative to government consumption) is robust both to adding the extent of central 
government and to political structure characteristics (Tables A1 and B1).     
 
3.2 Public investment Vs. government consumption 
The same diff-in-diff technique is used in Table 5 to explore the effect of fiscal rules 
on the second important aspect of the composition of government expenditures: 
public investment relative to government consumption. Public investment should not 
be affected by budget rules in countries that have adopted a "golden rule" type such as 
in the UK. To address that, a dummy variable, with a value of 1 for UK during the 
years of the golden rule and 0 otherwise, has been added to the investment   13
regressions. A similar dummy variable was used for Japan, which according to Von 
Hagen (1996) had specific provisions for investment since 1983. 
 
Unlike the robust results on the effect of fiscal rules on the compositional shift 
towards less social transfers, the finding regarding public investment is highly 
unstable. Table 5 shows that on the one hand, fiscal rules at national level have either 
insignificant impact on public investment (BTARGET) or even positive and 
significant effect (ETARGET). Moreover, the coefficients of fiscal rules are highly 
sensitive to the inclusion of year fixed effects. On the other hand,  the dummy 
variables for Maastricht Treaty and SGP have a negative and significant effect on the 
rate of change of public investment relative to the growth rate of government 
consumption (SGP is only borderline significant).
18  This result is line with the 
concern raised by several authors (e.g., Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2004) regarding the 
negative effect that Maastricht treaty related rules would have on public investment. 
 
We have got the same unstable result as before when replacing government 
consumption by public wage bill (columns 7 and 8 in Table 5). While the effect of 
national fiscal rules is either insignificant or even positive, the Maastricht and SGP 
budget rules have negative and significant coefficients at 5 and 1 percent, respectively 
(the last two regressions are not reported). 
 
Tables A2 and B2 do not show once again stable and clear effect of the various 
definitions of fiscal rules on the growth rate of public investment (relative to 
                                                  
18 One additional reason for the reduction of public investment is the increase of Public-Private 
partnerships (PPP) in the nineties (OECD, 2008). Beyond the technical problem of unavailability of 
consistent international data for controlling for this variable, it is not clear whether it would be an 
exogenous variable or related – at least to some extent - to the adoption of fiscal rules.   14
government consumption). The significance, and in one specification even the sign, is 
sensitive to the inclusion of year fixed effect. 
 
4. Policy preferences and the effect of fiscal rules 
To what extent (if any) the change in the composition of government expenditures 
against social transfers documented in the previous section has been intended? Put 
differently, is the change in the composition of government expenditures artificially 
linked to fiscal rules? One alternative explanation is  that this compositional shift 
reflects the wishes of countries to cut the excessive level of transfer payments relative 
to consumption, and that desire was translated into fiscal rules. According to this 
view, the compositional shift due to fiscal rules is capturing the effect of an omitted 
variable: the preferences toward  a lower level of transfer payments relative to 
consumption. A second related question is whether OECD countries with better 
constitutional safeguards for social transfers tend to exhibit weaker change in the 
composition of government expenditures as a result of adopting fiscal rules.  
  
4.1 Is FWTW the driving force? 
It is more difficult to find variables that encapsulate preferences for a change in 
redistribution policy than for its level. Nevertheless, we employ the timing at which 
what is known as "From Welfare To Work" (FWTW) policy was first implemented as 
a variable that may reflect the desire for a change. During the nineties, governments in 
many OECD countries have adopted FWTW policy. To assess the partial effect of 
fiscal rules after taking into account the effect FWTW on transfer payments, the 
following panel regression is estimated:  
 (2)    t , c t c t , c t , c t , c t , c FWTW X ETARGET Y ε + φ + δ + η + γ + β + α =    15
Where the dependent variable, Yc,t, represents the difference between the rate of 
change of transfer payments and the rate of change of government consumption in 
country c in year t. FWTW is the new variable added to the previous list of control 
variables. We will use different versions of FWTW to explore the extent to which the 
size of β is affected by the introduction of FWTW. 
 
One should expect that the coefficient for an expenditure rule would become 
insignificant as a result of the introduction of FWTW if indeed the adoption of a fiscal 
rule merely reflects a fundamental preference shift that explains both FWTW and 
fiscal rule and consequently the decline in the growth rate of transfer payments 
relative to government consumption. In Table 6 we consider the possibility of a policy 
change during the nineties, and we expect that countries that followed the imposition 
of the policy known as FWTW, which has combined active and passive labor market 
expenditures with a cut in other government transfers, was analyzed in many OECD 
reports, and summarized by Martin (2000), Martin and Grubb (2001) and Brender, 
Peled and Kasir (2002).
 19  
 
Three different dummy variables are considered to account for the lack of general 
agreement regarding the date of implementing FWTW policy. We first consider a 
general adoption of this policy by using a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
since 1990, and 0 otherwise for all countries except Iceland (FWTW_90). Martin and 
Grubb (2001) show detailed data at the country level for all OECD countries in our 
sample, except Iceland. According to the data shown in their Table 1 and Figure 1, 
                                                  
19 Martin (2000) and Martin and Grubb (2001) define active expenditure as spending on items targeted 
at increasing participation in the labor market, and passive expenditure as spending on income 
transfers, namely unemployment benefits and early retirement pensions.   16
there was a clear jump in FWTW policies starting in 1990. A change in policy since 
1990 is reported also in Figure 1 of Banks et al. (2005), based on an index of 
unemployment benefits duration. 
 
The second dummy variable (FWTW_C) assumes heterogeneity in the adoption date 
of FWTW policy according to total spending on labor market programs as reported by 
Martin and Grubb (2001, Table 1); these authors show that in Japan, Norway, Greece 
and New Zealand the FWTW policy started even before 1990. Our third variable, 
FWTW_97 is based on the information reported by Brender, Peled and Kasir (2002), 
who summarize FWTW policies in the OECD countries based on country surveys 
published by the both the OECD and the IMF, during the years 1998-2001; their study 
reports an acceleration of FWTW policies in many countries since 1997. In 
accordance, we use a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 since 1997, and 0 
otherwise, for relevant countries (15 out of the 22 countries in our sample).
20 
 
We restrict ourselves to expenditures target, since our analysis concentrates on the 
expenditure side of the budget. The results that are presented in Table 6 show that 
expenditures rules continue to have a negative and significant effect on the 
composition of government expenditures against social transfers, even after 
controlling for FWTW policy under all its different definitions. Note that the size of 
the estimated coefficient for the expenditure rule (ETARGET) is only marginally 
smaller as compared to the specification without the dummy for "From Welfare To 
Work" policy. 
 
                                                  
20 The countries that accelerated the adoption of FWTW are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, UK and USA.     17
The dummy variables for FWTW (especially FWTW_90 and FWTW_97) are 
correlated with year fixed effects and therefore regressions with and without year 
fixed effects are provided in Table 6. In general, FWTW policy has a negative effect 
on the rate of change of transfer payments but it is significant at 5 percent in two out 
of the three definitions. The coefficients for FWTW lose their significance once year 
fixed effects are introduced, as would be expected.  
 
4.2 Fiscal rules and legal protection  
In Table 7 we examine whether countries that have legal institutions, that are intended 
to protect social rights, exhibit different patterns in terms of the composition of 
government expenditures after the implementation of budget rules. To study the 
interaction between fiscal rules and legal protection the following equation is 
estimated: 
(3)   
t , c t c c t , c t , c t , c t , c t , c ) LP * ETARGET ( FWTW X ETARGET Y ε + φ + δ + λ + η + γ + β + α =  
As before, Yc,t symbolizes the difference between the rate of change of transfer 
payments and the rate of change of government consumption in country c in year t. 
LPc is the degree of legal protection for social security in country c. The interaction 
term (ETARGET* LPc) allows for variation in the effect of fiscal rules on the 
composition of government expenditures according to the level of commitment to 
social security. LPc is a variable that has one value for each country and therefore 
could not appear in the same estimation together with country fixed effects, δc. 
 
Two different variables are employed to capture the degree of legal commitment to 
social security. The first variable is based on Botero et al. (2004) who constructed an   18
index of social security strength built on the coverage of various branches of social 
security laws such as pensions, disabilities and unemployment benefits. We used a 
dummy variable (SSLAWS) that takes the value of 1 for countries with an index 
higher than the median (as reported for all the countries in their sample), and 0 
otherwise. Using this threshold, the list of countries that have a strong social security 
system includes all the countries in our sample except Belgium, Netherlands, US and 
Japan. 
 
The second variable (SSCONST) that represents the extent of legal protection for 
social rights is borrowed from Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2007) who created an index of 
social security strength based on the constitutional commitment for seven features of 
social security. Their index, which ranges between 0 and 3, is characterized by a 
higher variance among developed countries as compared to Botero et al. (2004). 
Using the same classification as before (i.e., below and above the median), the 
countries with strong constitutional commitment for social security are: Finland, 
Switzerland, Portugal, Italy and Spain. 
 
The use of a dummy variable has the advantage of allowing us to characterize the 
overall policy reaction of countries with strong social security. The overall policy 
response in countries with strong social security is represented by the sum of the 
coefficients of the fiscal rule and an interaction term of legal protection dummy and 
expenditure rule dummy. To allow for more flexible specification of the social 
security indexes, we also run regressions using an interaction between fiscal rules and 
the value of the indexes (SSLAWS_INDEX and SSCONST_INDEX).  
   19
The coefficient of expenditure rule is negative and significant in all 8 specifications 
that appear in Table 7. However, the sum of SSCONST*ETARGET and ETARGET 
coefficients is close to zero implying that fiscal rules do lead to compositional shift 
against transfer payments only in countries with a weak constitutional commitment to 
social security. The same picture emerges when social security coverage variable is 
used: the difference between the rate of change of transfer payments and government 
consumption has not been significantly affected by the introduction of fiscal rules in 
countries with more comprehensive coverage of social security. When we use the 
indexes instead of the dummy variables, we get also significant results. In summary, 
these results suggest that better legal protection for social security makes a difference. 
 
An alternative specification would be to include a dummy for legal variables 
SSLAWS or SSCONST (the main effect) in addition to the interaction term. 
However, these regressions can be performed only if country fixed effects are 
excluded. Running these regressions yield similar results: the sum of ETARGET and 
the interaction term is close to zero, and the coefficients of these terms are significant 
at 1 percent (not reported here). 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
Fiscal rules constituted a useful tool for advanced countries in reducing general 
government budget deficits.  It is shown in our empirical estimations that both budget 
and expenditure rules succeeded, at national as well as multinational (Maastricht and 
SGP) levels, in reducing the rate of increase in total government expenditures and the 
level of budget deficits as a percent of GDP. 
   20
In this paper we found a relatively large compositional effect of implementing fiscal 
rules: the ratio of social transfers to government consumption (and to government 
wages) tend to decline more rapidly in countries implementing fiscal rules compared 
to countries without such rules.   
 
We have shown that the decline in the ratio of transfers to government consumption is 
significant even after controlling for cuts in transfers as a result of "From Welfare to 
Work" Programs, which were adopted by many OECD countries during the nineties. 
This finding suggests that this compositional shift might be partially unintended.  
 
The compositional shift due to fiscal rules found here should be judged in light of the 
negative (strong) correlation between the share of social transfers and income 
inequality measures.  Note that most OECD countries have witnessed a rising income 
inequality in the same period that fiscal rules became widespread (OECD, 2008).  
 
Interestingly, we found that the change in the composition of government 
expenditures against social transfers vanishes for countries with strong legal 
commitment for a social safety net, as measured by the degree of constitutional 
commitment to social rights and by social security coverage in laws. This finding 
shows that countries can design a package of rules to avoid an unintended reduction in 
social transfers relatively to government consumption.   21
Figure 1a - Government Transfers over Government Consumption: Expenditure 
Rules at the National Level 








































































































































Figure 1b – Government Transfers over Government Consumption: Budget 
Rules at the National Level 
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Figure 1c – Government Investment over Government Consumption: Selected 
Countries participating at Maastricht Treaty 
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Budget Rule  Expenditure 
Rule 
Country 
-  -  1985-1990 and 1998 + 1985-1990  Australia 
1997 +  1992 +  2000 +  -  Austria 
1997 +  1992 +  1993 +  1993-1999  Belgium 
-  -  1991 +  1991-1996  Canada 
-  1993 +  1998 +  1998 +  Denmark 
1997 +  1992 +  1979 +  2002 +  Germany 
1997 +  1994 +  -  1991 +  Finland 
1997 +  1992 +  -  1998 +  France 
1997 +  1992 +  -  -  Greece 
-  -  -  -  Iceland 
1997 +  1992 +  -  -  Ireland 
1997 +  1992 +  -  2002 +  Italy 
-  -  2002 +  1983 +  Japan 
1997 +  1992 +  1983-1993  1994 +  Netherlands 
-  -  1994 +  1994 +  New Zealand 
-  -  2001 +  -  Norway 
1997 +  1992 +  -  -  Portugal 
1997 +  1992 +  2004 +  -  Spain 
-  -  2001 +  2001 +  Switzerland 
-  1994 +  1996 +  1996 +  Sweden 
-  1993 +  1998 +  -  UK 
-  -  1985-1990  -  USA 
* The symbol + means that the rule continues until the end of the sample.   27
Table 2: Fiscal rules and budget deficits, GMM method 
Dependent Variable  D (Government Deficit/Y) 
Number of observations : 890 
Period : 1964-2006 
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(2.8) 




































      





MAAS       -0.63 
(0.07)*** 
 
SGP        -0.44 
(0.09)*** 
Year fixed effects  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No 
Adj. R
2  0.33 0.50 0.30 0.49 0.34 0.32 
The dependent variable and the non-dummies independent variables are moving averages over 4 years. 
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses, using Period Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PSCE). 
Instruments: one lag difference for fiscal rules variables; same variables with the same moving 
average length for all the other variables.  For all regressions we use country fixed effects. 
*** significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent. 
   28
Table 3: Fiscal rules and total government expenditures, GMM method 
Dependent Variable  D(Total Government Expenditure) 
Number of observations : 920 
Period : 1964-2006 























































      





MAAS       -0.031 
(0.002)*** 
 
SGP        -0.028 
( 0.002)*** 
Year fixed effects  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No 
Adj. R
2  0.41 0.63 0.39 0.63 0.47 0.44 
The dependent variable and the non-dummies independent variables are moving averages over 4 years. 
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses, using Period PCSE. Instruments: one lag difference 
for fiscal rules variables; same variables with the same moving average length for all the other 
variables. For all regressions we use country fixed effects. 
*** significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent. 
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Table 4: Fiscal rules and expenditures composition, GMM method 
Transfer Payments Vs. Government Consumption 
Dependent 




Number of observations : 826  No. of observations : 724 
Period : 1964-2006  Period : 1964-2005 





























































































       








MAAS       -0.007 
(0.002)*** 
    
SGP 
 





  No    Yes No Yes No No No  Yes 
Adj. R
2  0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.28  0.27 0.38  0.38 
The dependent variable and the non-dummies independent variables are moving averages over 4 years. 
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses, using Period PCSE. Instruments: one lag difference 
for fiscal rules variables; same variables with the same moving average length for all the other 
variables. For all regressions we use country fixed effects. 
*** significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.   30
Table 5: Fiscal rules and expenditures composition, GMM method 
Public investment Vs. Government Consumption 
Dependent 




Number of observations : 893  No. of observations : 785 
Period : 1964-2006  Period : 1964-2005 



















































































       
















MAAS       -0.026 
(0.007)*** 
    
SGP 
 





No Yes No Yes No No No  Yes 
Adj. R
2  0.29 0.33 0.29 0.34 0.30  0.29 0.28  0.31 
 
The dependent variable and the non-dummies independent variables are moving averages over 4 years. 
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses, using Period PCSE. Instruments: one lag difference 
for fiscal rules variables; same variables with the same moving average length for all the other 
variables. For all regressions we use country fixed effects. 
*** significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent. 
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Table 6: Fiscal Rules or "From Welfare To Work"? GMM method 
Dependent variable  Dlog(Transfer payments)-Dlog(government consumption) 
Number of observations : 826  
Period : 1964-2006 
















































































     




   




Year fixed effects  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Adj. R
2  0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.30 
The dependent variable and the non-dummies independent variables are moving averages over 4 years. 
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses, using Period PCSE. Instruments: one lag difference 
for fiscal rules variables; same variables with the same moving average length for all the other 
variables. For all regressions we use country fixed effects. 
*** significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.   32
Table 7: Expenditure composition and legal protection for social security, GMM 
method 
Dependent Variable  Dlog(Transfer payments)-Dlog(government consumption) 
Number of observations : 826  
Period : 1964-2006 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 























































































































       




     
SSCONST_INDEX*ET
ARGET 




   
SSLAWS_INDEX*ETA
RGET 




No  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Adj. R
2  0.31 0.32 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.30 
The dependent variable and the non-dummies independent variables are moving averages over 4 years. 
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses, using Period PCSE. Instruments: one lag difference 
for fiscal rules variables; same variables with the same moving average length for all the other 
variables.  For all regressions we use country fixed effects. 
*** significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.   33
Appendix A – Robustness Check: Adding central government volume  
 
Table A1: Fiscal rules and expenditures composition, GMM method 
Transfer Payments Vs. Government Consumption 
Dependent variable  Dlog(Transfer Payments)-Dlog(Government  Consumption) 
Number of observations : 826  
Period : 1964-2006 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 


































































      






    





Central government * 
ETARGET 





MAAS       -0.0026 
(0.005) 
 





      0.015 
(0.006)** 
Central government*SGP        -0.020 
(0.007)*** 
Year Fixed effects  No Yes No Yes No No 
Adj. R
2  0.28 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.28 
The dependent variable and the non-dummies independent variables are moving averages over 4 years. 
Standard deviations are reported using Period PCSE. Instruments: one lag difference for fiscal rules; 
same variables for all the other variables. In all regressions we use country fixed effects. 
We use a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for countries where the central government accounts 
for over 70 percent of the general government total expenditure (source: GFS). 
*** significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.   34
Table A2: Fiscal rules and expenditures composition, GMM method 
Public investment Vs. Government Consumption 
Dependent variable  Dlog(Public Investment)-Dlog(Government Consumption) 
Number of observations : 893 
Period : 1964-2006 
























































     









     






    





Central government * 
ETARGET 



















      0.030 
(0.02) 
Year Fixed effects  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No 
Adj. R
2  0.29 0.33 0.29 0.34 0.30 0.29 
See footnote to Table A1. 
*** significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.   35
Appendix B- Robustness Check: adding political structure variables 
Table B1: Fiscal rules and expenditures composition, GMM method 
Transfer Payments Vs. Government Consumption 
Dependent variable  Dlog(Transfer Payments)-Dlog(Government  Consumption) 
Number of  observations: 665 
Period: 1975-2006 

























































































































    










      -0.002 
(0.002) 
Year  Fixed  effects  No Yes No Yes No No 
Adj. R
2  0.30 0.33 0.31 0.34 0.30 0.28 
The political variables are taken from the Database of Political Institutions of the World Bank presenting the 
political structures and the political atmosphere. Since political data is available for a sub-period of the sample, the 
number of observations in these regressions is substantially lower. The variables used are dummy variables: 
Parliamentary- takes the value 1 if the government system is parliamentary and 0 otherwise; Right and Left Wing 
– takes the value 1 when the main government party is right or left oriented (center orientation parties are the 
reference party); Proportional Representation – takes the value 1 if the voting system is proportional and o 
otherwise.  See also footnote to Table A1. 
*** significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.   36
Table B2: Fiscal rules and expenditures composition, GMM method 
Public investment Vs. Government Consumption 
Dependent variable  Dlog(Public Investment)-Dlog(Government Consumption) 
Number of observations: 663 
Period: 1975-2006 























































     




   


























































    





MAAS       -0.022 
(0.007)*** 
 
SGP        -0.015 
(0.009) 
Year Fixed effects  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No 
Adj. R
2  0.25 0.25 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.21 
See also footnotes to Table B1. 
 *** significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.   37
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